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The Impact of Judicial Reform on the
Minnesota Supreme Court
STEVEN H. HATTING and JOSEPH F. KELLER*

ABSTRACT - On November 2, 1982, a majority of Minnesota voters approved a constitutional amendment that
transformed the state's appellate judiciary. A newly created Court of Appeals, currently consisting of 12 judges,
began accepting cases on August 1, 1983, and deciding them on November 1, 1983. To assess the consequences
of this change, ·the authors explored the rationale underlying the amendment, examined the anticipated costs
and benefits of implementation, and analyzed case load data. Questionnaire responses from members of the
Supreme Court are discussed, jurisdictional relationships between the two courts are explained, and decision ·
making practices are compared (including oral argument and published opinion frequency in cases raising
constitutional questions). Prospects for enhancing the quality and reducing the quantity of decisions by the
Supreme Court are good due to: 1) the diversion of nearly 80% of new filings since August 1983 to the Court of
Appeals; and 2) the rapidity with which the Court of Appeals, sitting in panels of three, has been clearing its
docket. The full impact of the reform had not yet been felt in Supreme Court chambers by February 1985. The
time lag was due to the priority the high court was giving to disposition of a 1200-case backlog.

Introduction

Materials and Methods

The Minnesota Court of Appeals was brought into legal
being by constitutional amendment in November 1982. Since
then, Governor Rudy Perpich has appointed a full complement of 12 judges for terms of 6 years to the ranks of this
intermediate appellate body: Chief)udge Peter Popovich (St.
Mary's Point) and associate judges Gary Crippen (Worthing·
ton), Daniel Foley (Rochester), Thomas Forsberg (Fridley),
Doris Ohlsen Huspeni (Minneapolis), Harriet Lansing (St.
Paul), David Leslie (Golden Valley) , Roger Nierengarten (Sar·
tell), Edward Parker (Minneapolis), R. A. Randell (Hibbing),
Susanne Sedgwick (Excelsior), and D. D. Wozniak (St. Paul).
This Court of Appeals has been accepting case filings since
August 1983 and has been disposing ofthem since November
1983, sitting in three-judge panels.
The Minnesota Supreme Court is the oldest court of state·
wide jurisdiction and, until the Court of Appeals commenced
operation, was the only appeals court authorized by the state
constitution. Current membership includes Chief Justice
Douglas K. Amdahl (Minneapolis), and associate justices M.
Jeanne Coyne (Edina), Glenn E. Kelley (St. Paul), C. Donald
Peterson (Edina), George M. Scott (Minneapolis), John E.
Simonett (St. Paul), Rosalie E. Wahl (Lake Elmo), and Law·
renee R. Yetka (Maplewood). The vacancy on the ninemember court is due to the resignation of John). Todd on
March 8, 1985.
Why was the amendment proposed? What consequences
will its approval have for the administration of justice in
Minnesota, especially with regard to the Supreme Court? This
study seeks to answer these and related questions.

Because previous studies of the appellate process in Minnesota, along with any recommendations made at an earlier
date, would serve as a potentially fruitful source of informa·
tion about the circumstances leading to ratification of the
amendment, a series of three reports written under a variety of
auspices between 1968 and 1974 was consulted and its advice
noted (1).
Second, filing and disposition data from cases appealed to
the Supreme Court were examined in search of an underlying
rationale for the amendment. How an appellate court's time is
spent deciding cases might be indicated through a number of
recent trends - proportion of filings dismissed, summarily
affirmed or reversed, orally argued, or unanimously decided.
How often a court justifies its decisions with published, indi·
vi dually authored opinions also may reveal whether delibera·
tion or abbreviation characterizes its proceedings. A court
beset by augmented caseload demands might be expected to
dismiss, summarily review, and unanimously decide an
increasing fraction of its docket. Such a group of judges would
also be expected to entertain oral argument and to author full
opinions for the edification of litigants, bench, bar, and atten·
tive public in a diminishing proportion of its case filings
through time.
Third, the relevant sections of the Minnesota Constitution
and Statutes-at· Large were scrutinized on the theory that,
indeed, caseload pressure was the prime reason the proposal
was made (2). If so, the jurisdictional relationship between
the two courts ideally would have been altered in such a way
as to relieve the Supreme Court of numerous types of cases
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coming to it on direct appeal. Major categories of trial court
dispositio ns would be redirected elsewhere.
Fourth, the authors prepared and mailed a questionnaire
consisting of seven open-ended items, along with a cover
letter, to each of the nine members of the Supreme Court in
November 1984. A collective response was received in midDecember under the Chief]ustice's signature. Such firsthand
reactions based on the experiences of the justices themselves
are valuable, of course. No one is in a superior position to
appreciate the extent to which the Court's task has been
altered.
Finally, the authors read some 70 cases printed in the
Northwestern Reporter. They were not randomly selected.
Rather, cases in which constitutio nal interpretation was
requested of the Court by one or both parties were singled out
from among those to which the Court might be expected to
give close attention. With constitutional issues presented, the
statewide import of such cases was very likely to engage the
Court's interest. We deliberately chose a class of cases the
processing of which might be highly resistant to the effects of
agenda overload. The collegial, deliberative character of the
Court wou ld be likely to figure promin ently in the decisions
reached . In other words, these are matters about which the
membership would probably feel obliged to invite oral argume nt, to issue opinions, and perhaps, due to individual effort
expended, to disagree in the casting of their votes. Similarly,
these are controversies incompatible with disposition by
mere dismissal or summary judgment.
What difference would the availability of a Court of Appeals
to accept case filings make in the way such cases were pro·
cessed? To find out, the authors used August 1, 1983, the date
on wh ich the Court of Appeals began to docket cases, as the
dividing line between two equal time periods of 13 months
each. If implementation of the amendment had an immediate
impact o n Supreme Court caseload, disposition data for the
Co urt should show a marked contrast between the two time
periods studied. More specifically, a sudden decline in
Supreme Court output would suggest that the reform measure
was yielding intended results.

Results and Discussion
That the "wheels of justice grind exceedingly slow" and that
"justice delayed is justice deni ed" are all-too-familiar criticisms of judicial process in general. Exp lanations vary. But for
th e Supreme Court of Minnesota, recent delay can be safely
attributed to an overwhelming demand for its services.
Indeed , storm clouds of instituti onal overload were evident
o n the horizon nearly 20 years ago. Between 1968 and 1978,
for example, the volume of filings and the average elapsed
time between filing and disposition doubled to roughly 1200
cases and 16 months, respectively. By August 1983, when the
amendment became operative, the corresponding annual figures were almost 1700 cases and 21 months. This disposition
period is far in excess of the American Bar Association's
recommendation of 7 months for crim inal appeals and 8
months for civil appeals (3).
Table 1 illustrates the changing nature of Supreme Court
review in the wake of mo unting caseload demand. The
number of cases accorded disposition thro ugh published
opini o n increased gradually during the decade preceding
ratification of the amendment. However, the number of such
cases as a percentage of those fil ed declined sharply during
the mid-1970s. Table 2 reveals a similar trend regarding oral
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argument. Even state courts of last resort can become institutio ns of low public visibility when these two procedures fall
into relative disuse. As Chi ef Justice Douglas Amdahl points
o ut, "Oral argument is very important to an informed disposi tio n of cases. Questi ons always arise during consideration of
briefs and the record on appeal, and the oral argument provides an opportunity for a judge to seek answers and to discuss
with counsel matters important to a decision" ( 4). In tande m,
oral argument and written opinion assure the litigant that a
court has considered the merits of his claim. Opinions provide guidance about how to deal with legal affairs in the futur~
as well.

Table 1. Filings and dispositions by full opinion by the Minnesota
Supreme Court in selected years.
Filings
Opinion Disposition
Percentage by Opinion Disposition

1973
686
341
50%

1978
1206
361
30%

1982
1592
518
32%

Table 2. Filings and dispositions using oral argument before the
Minnesota Supreme Court in selected years.
Filings
Cases Argued
Percentage of Cases Argued

1973

1978

686
184
27%

1206
361*
30%

1982
1592
139
9%

•1n 1978, oral argument was heard by panels of three justices rather than by the
entire court.

Table 3 shows the ongoing degeneration of the Court's
caseload control during the years immediately preceding the
reform. As filings increased, the number of dispositions by
dismissal and/ or summary affirmance of trial court o utcomes
grew ever- more dramatically. Perhaps that trend is indicative
of an ever larger propo rtion of frivolous appeals; p erhaps not.
The potential danger is that time constraints replace intrinsic
merit as the decisive criterion in determining which matters
receive thorough review. As Stephen Eckman, president of the
Minnesota Trial Lawyers' Association observed, "The Supreme
Court had . . .become so inundated by. . .appeals that it was
issuing ... summary affirmances which had as their purpose
~

absolutely nothing but clearing its calendar" (5) .

Table 3. Dispositions, dispositions by dism issal and summary affir·
mance, and percentage of dispositions by dismissal and summary
affirmance by the Minnesota Supreme Court in selected years.

686
226
1

1978
770
340
40

1982
1352
288
433

33%

49%

53%

1973
Dispositions
Dismissals
Summary Affirmances
Percentage of Dispositions by
Dismissal and Summary
Affirmance

So serious had docket pressure become by 1981 that drastic
reform measures were essential. The report of the Judicial
Planning Committee circulated that same year endorsed

Journal of the Minnesota Academy of Science

· restructuring of the appellate judiciary and deemed
on of an intermediate court of review to be an urgent
ty (6). Clearly, the series of incremental changes insti during the 1970s had failed to ease the burden of the
me Court. For example, the legislative authorization of
dditional seats on the Court in 1973 ironically may have
1ened rather than shortened case processing time. On
her hand, convening prehearing conferences in all civil
hearing oral argument in panels of only three justices,
~mporarily using trial court judges to hear appeals did
~ rate the appellate process as intended. As Table 3
s, dispositions increased but were still not commensuwith the explosion in filings. The basic problem
ned: the Supreme Court was deciding an insufficient
)er of cases, and of those decided, more and more were
·ing only cursory review.
~ Court 's dissatisfaction with these expedients became
ent in the summer of 1980. On September 1, the Court
ioned the practice of hearing oral argument in panels.
·ently the justices were concerned that the practice was
ging the institution's collegial tradition. Several weeks
r in his State of the Judiciary address before the Minne;tate Bar Association, former Chief Justice Sheran had
1nced an alternative strategy: oral argument, a timerming procedure, would henceforth be limited to a maxt of 160 cases per term (7). The policy remained operalfough the 1982 term of the Court.
w much caseloacl relief ratification of the proposed
dment might afford would depend on the jurisdictional
)nship of the new tribunal with the old. Jurisdiction is
tthority to decide legal controversies, to say what the law
~jurisdiction of the Minnesota Supreme Court and Court
peals is specified in Article VI , sections 1 and 2 of the
~sota Constitution. Figures 1 ancl2 depict what the conon states.

~~

Aalllln l stra1'1ve
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1. former Minnesota Appellate Court System.

r of decisions

ti·om district courts, district appeal panels, the tax
:)f appeals, Economic Security Commission, and Worker's
~nsation Commission proceeds to the Supreme Court on
1ppeal. Review of decisions from conciliation courts, county
micipal courts, and administrative agencies is filtered through
trict appeal panels to the Supreme Court.
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Figure 2. Present Minnesota Appellate Court System.
Only appeal from exceptional district court cases may proceed to the
Supreme Court directly along with review of decisions from the Tax
Court of Appeals and Worker's Compensation Commission. All other
appellate cases originating in the district courts, county and municipal courts, conciliation courts, Economic Security Commission, and
administrative agencies cannot reach the Supreme Court without
prior review by the Court of Appeals.

Formerly, the constitution provided that the Supreme Court
.shall have original jurisdiction in such remedial cases as
are prescribed by law and appellate jurisdiction in all cases. .. "
However, this provision had not contributed to the caseload
nightmare to the extent that its words would suggest. In
practice, the Court had not construed this italicized passage as
mandatory. Instead, the Court created an expedient of its own
by holding in a 1974 case that appellate review is not a right
guaranteed by the constitution (8).
Under the new arrangement , the Court of Appeals is assuming between 80% and 90% of initial appeals that had before
been directed to the Supreme Court. The remainder continue
to come directly to the Supreme Court. In addition, appeals to
the Supreme Court from an adverse judgment by the Court of
Appeals is wholly discretionary with the high court. This
system is similar to the certiorari jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court. Tables 4 and 5 reveal the profound
impact the new jurisdictional framework is having on the
Supreme Court's agenda.
At first glance one might suspect that this jurisdictional
juggling act will merely shift the balance of the Supreme
Court 's former case load onto the shoulders of a dozen other
judges who would soon be mired clown in identical demand
overload. However, this is unlikely because the Court of
Appeals sits in panels of three. Actually, the twelve-member
Court consists of four smaller courts for the purpose of deciding cases. Unlike the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals has
no obligation to establish or to maintain a tradition of colle
gial, policy-oriented decision making. Further, Chapter 480A
of the Minnesota Statutes-at-Large empowers the governor to
appoint additional members at two-year intervals as the trend
in filings might warrant. In essence, five appellate courts now
function were only one existed prior to November 1, 1983.
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Table 4. Filings in the Minnesota Supreme Court by case type during
two selected time periods.

Civil Appeal
Criminal Appeal
Certiorari - Workers'
Compensation*
Certiorari -Tax Court*
Certiorari - Economic
Security Comm.
Discretionary Review
Writs of Mandamus/
Prohibition
Attorney Discipline*
Other*
Total

July 1, 1982July 31, 1983

August 1, 1983August 31, 1984

924
373

59
43

166
15

111
19

139
141

1
81

97
19
15

35
21
22

1889

392

*These categories continue to be filed directly in the Supreme Court,
bypassing action by the Court of Appeals. The "Other" category
consists in part of appeals from first-degree murder convictions and
contested elections.

Table 5. Dispositions by the Minnesota Supreme Court by type
during two selected time periods.

Summary Affirmance
Summary Reversal
Dismissal
Full Opinion
Per Curiam Opinion*
Denial/Discharge
Petitions for Review from
the Court of Appeals
Total

July 1, 1982July 31, 1983

August 1, 1983August 31, 1984

469
424
499
15
264

318
0
249
450
9
116

0

96

1674

1238
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*Per Curiam Opinions are written without personal authorship. The
phrase means literally "for the Court."

Tables 6 and 7 show the actions of the Court of Appeals during
its first 13 months of operation. Combining the 1471 cases
disposed of with the 1238 resolved by the Supreme Court
during a slightly earlier 13-month period translates into an
appellate output of over 2700 cases - more than double that
during any previous comparable time span.
Another salutary effect of the reform is enhanced public
access to a state court of review. By sitting in various locations
around the state, rather than only in St. Paul, the three-judge
panels of the Court of Appeals are potentially less costly to
petition. Expenses for travel and lodging are often less burdensome for litigant and lawyer alike. The meritorious cause
is not likely to be discouraged under these circumstances. The
legally irrelevant but too often materially critical considerations of expense and delay are of diminished concern. Conversely, though, the frivolous appeal is more likely to be filed
as access is improved. The point to be noted here is that
making those distinctions is now in the hands of the Court of
Appeals, not the Supreme Court.
By contrast, a serious objection to the reform has yet to be
tested. Skeptics worry that the precedential value of decisions
made by multiple panels of the Court of Appeals will be
questionable for two reasons ( 6). First, differently constituted
panels will inevitably reach inconsistent conclusions in cases
presenting similar fact patterns and legal issues over time.

6

What is the status of such decisions absent Supreme Court
reconciliation of the conflict? If those situations become
numerous, meaningful case load relief for the Supreme Court
is jeopardized. Second, any litigant suffering defeat before the
Court of Appeals might well pursue the cause a step further
with attendant costs. Will such behavior distort the intended
effect of the reform by reducing the Court of Appeals to little
more than a costly waystation to the Supreme Court?
At this writing insufficient time has passed to determine
with confidence whether these concerns are of substance.
What evidence we have indicates that between November 1,
1983, and October 31, 1984, just under 20% (about 300) of all
actions by the Court of Appeals were filed with the Supreme
Court. This figure is comparable to that in adjacent states
(Iowa and Wisconsin) and would appear to cast doubt on the
reservations discussed above. In turn, the Supreme Court has
granted review to about one-fifth (about 60) of those petitions, roughly twice as high proportionally as in neighboring
states. Even if that trend persists, the Supreme Court will be
dealing with, perhaps, 250 to 300 cases per year, a six- or
seven-fold reduction compared with the 1981-1984 terms.
We also know that the Court of Appeals is achieving more
than mere expedition of decision making. Three-judge panels
are hearing argument and publishing opinions in virtually all
cases - some 773 between January and October of 1984
alone (9). The full impact of the amendment will not be felt by
the Supreme Court until sometime in 1985. As late as February
1, 1985, Chief Justice Douglas Amdahl and his colleagues
carried on much as they had before the amendment's approval 27 months earlier. The Chief Justice explains the delay:
"Our primary concern has been to dispose of the backlog of
cases pending on August 1, 1983" (there were 1187 of them)
(4).

Table 6. Filings in the Minnesota Court of Appeals by case type.
August 1, 1983August 31, 1984
Civil Appeal
Criminal Appeal
Certiorari - Workers' Compensation*
Certiorari -Tax Court*
Certiorari - Economic Security Comm.
Discretionary Review
Writs of Mandamus/Prohibition
Attorney Discipline*
Other*
Total

1357
495
0
0
113
109
78
0
67
2219

*These categories continue to be filed directly with the Supreme Court.

Table 7. Dispositions by the Minnesota Court of Appeals by type
during the first 13 months in operation.
November 1, 1983November 30, 1984
731
17
561
140
20

Full Opinion
Memorandum Opinion
Dismissal
Denial/Discharge
Certified*
Stayed

2

Total

1471

*Certified disposition is one in which the Court is asked to provide an
answer to a question raising a point of law concerning a case pending
in a trial court.
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As this logjam breaks up , the contours of future Supreme
Court decision making should take shape. The Court's disposition of cases presenting constitutional issues indicates just
how small the reform's impact had been in the first year after
the Court of Appeals began generating its own agenda. Table 8
indicates rhat the Supreme Court has been as pressed for time
since as before. A more deliberate approach would allow
more argument and engender more intra-court dissent. Those
developments should occur within the coming months as
Table 4 suggests. The dramatic shift in new filings, if it persists,
should enable the Supreme Court to reestablish its policymaking role at the pinnacle of the Minnesota judiciary.

Table 8. Cases presenting constitutional issues before the Minnesota
Supreme Court for two selected time periods.

Cases
Argued Cases
Unanimous Cases
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July 1, 1982July31, 1983

August 1, 1983 August 31, 1984

36
18 (50%)
30 (83%)

33
16 (48%)
27 (82%)
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